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ABSTRACT
Modern vehicles contain a few controller area networks (CANs),
which allow scores of on-board electronic control units (ECUs)
to communicate messages critical to vehicle functions and driver
safety. CAN provide a lightweight and reliable broadcast protocol
but is bere of security features. As evidenced by many recent
research works, CAN exploits are possible both remotely and with
direct access, fueling a growing CAN intrusion detection system
(IDS) body of research. A challenge for pioneering vehicle-agnostic
IDSs is that passenger vehicles’ CAN message encodings are propri-
etary, dened and held secret by original equipment manufacturers
(OEMs). Targeting detection of next-generation aacks, in which
messages are sent from the expected ECU at the expected time but
with malicious content, researchers are now seeking to leverage
“CAN data models”, which predict future CAN message contents
and use prediction error to identify anomalous, hopefully mali-
cious CAN messages. Yet, current works model CAN signals post-
translation, i.e., aer applying OEM-donated or reverse-engineered
translations from raw data. In this work, we present initial IDS
results testing deep neural networks used to predict CAN data at
the bit level, thereby providing IDS capabilities but avoiding reverse
engineering proprietary encodings. Our results suggest the method
is promising for continuous signals in CAN data, but struggles for
discrete, e.g., binary, signals.
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1 INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND
Modern vehicles are increasingly “drive-by-wire” meaning once-
mechanical interfaces of subsystems have been replaced by com-
munication of electronic control units (ECUs), or small computers
orchestrating the subsystems. Rather than using dedicated con-
nections for each ECU pair, a few controller area networks (CANs)
allow broadcast communications of all ECUs. In particular, we focus
on the high-speed (250Kbs-500Mbs) controller area network (CAN)
bus, as it is used for much of modern vehicle communications.
Figure 1: CAN 2.0 data frame depicted. Image from Cho &
Shin [3] of. ere are two important elds, the Arbitration
ID (AID) used for indexing and prioritizing frames and the
data eld containing up to 64 bits of message contents.
CAN 2.0 provides a standard protocol dening the physical and
data link layers [1]. See Figure 1 for the automotive CAN frame
format. Each packet’s information is contained in two elds, the
Arbitration ID (AID) used for indexing and prioritizing frames
and the data eld containing up to 64 bits of message contents.
e mapping of the data eld’s bits to the signals it encodes is a
proprietary secret, dened by the original equipmentmanufacturers
(OEMs, e.g., Ford, GM), and the encodings change depending on
make, model, year, and even vehicle specications. is poses an
obstacle for producing vehicle-agnostic solutions for automotive
CANs, in particular, defensive and oensive cyber security. See
recent work of Verma et al. [23], and Nolan et al. [17] on discovering
the syntax and semantics of automotive CAN data.
CAN is a reliable and lightweight protocol, but it has few se-
curity features, e.g., no encryption nor authentication, and has
been proven to be exploitable with direct access [2, 8, 13, 15] or
even remotely [14, 24]. e aack surface for in-vehicle CANs is
growing as cars become increasingly exposed e.g. via USB, cellular,
bluetooth and the advent of vehicle-to-vehicle and -infrastructure
networking. Providing eective intrusion detection for automotive
CANs is a burgeoning research topic [21].
1.1 Related CAN IDS Works
Initial automotive CAN IDS research has been rule-based [8, 16],
which pushes security to OEMs, as rules are dependent on CAN
encodings (model-specic) and may require knowledge of specic
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aacks. Multiple works [6, 15, 19] exploit message frequency anom-
alies for vehicle-agnostic detection of message injection aacks. In
response to the infamous Miller and Valesek remote Jeep hack [14]
(which used a masquerade aack in which one ECU sent malicious
braking signals while the brake ECU was silenced), multiple eorts
have proposed data-driven eorts for ECU identication to detect
AIDs originating from the wrong transmier [3, 4, 10].
e logical next-generation aack involves a reprogrammed
ECU sending appropriate AIDs with appropriate timing, but with
augmented, potentially malicious, data eld contents. Aer-market
“chipping” kits exhibit this capability by reprogramming ECUs,
although in practice these are used for performance-tuning, not
malicious purposes. Works are emerging that test supervised deep
learners trained on specic aacks with labeled data [9, 12]. We
seek anomaly detection to avoid training towards a specic aack.
Unsupervised CAN IDS research for detecting malicious message
contents has begun modeling correlations inherent to the CAN data
that may be broken by such aacks, admiing detection. Tyree et al.
[22] propose a manifold learning technique to identify relationships
in CAN data that are broken during aacks that do not coordinate
related signals. eir technique requires at least the ability to
tokenize (partition) the up-to 64-bit CAN data elds into signal-
sized messages but not fully translate the CAN data. e other three
works seeking to exploit CAN data correlations require complete
knowledge of the CAN signals: Ganesan et al. [5] learn correlation
of value pairs (e.g., speed, accelerator pedal position) using both
CAN and sensor data to detect injection aacks. IDS research of
Li [11] and of Testud [20] propose a three-step process to model
CAN packets and detect unexpected packets: (1) reverse engineer
or partner with an OEM to obtain many signals in the CAN data, (2)
train deep learning, neural network regressor(s) to predict the next
signal value(s) from the history of observations, (3) use the error in
predicted values from observed as an online anomaly detector.
We present initial results for a CAN prediction model without
step (1). at is, previous work translated the 64-bit data eld into
the signals it encodes (requiring OEM knowledge or tedious reverse
engineering) and built models of the signals. Rather, our approach
models an AID’s 64-bit data eld. Hence, we commence prediction
and detection (steps (2) and (3)) without requiring any translation
of the CAN message bits to signals.
1.2 Contributions
Our long-term goal is to provide an aer-market IDS for ideally all
passenger vehicles. is means we cannot rely on OEM-dened
CAN mappings. En route to this goal we adopt the neural network
CAN prediction model; specically, from a history of CAN data
our regressors predict the next CAN data eld, and we too use
prediction error to detect anomalous messages. Unlike the previous
two similar works [11, 20], we do not translate CAN data elds
to signals, as we do not have the OEM’s proprietary mappings.
Instead, we train a deep neural network for each AID to predict its
next 64-bit data eld.
e primary contribution of this work is presentation of initial
results showing ecacy of the bit-level CAN models for aack
detection. e benet of this approach is straight-forward—it ex-
tends the general CANmodeling frameworks for anomaly detection
(which relies critically on OEM-proprietary CAN mappings) to a
vehicle-agnostic detector, as no CAN mappings are assumed. Al-
though our focus is CAN IDS, CAN models can be used for other
applications, e.g. CAN simulators.
2 CAN PREDICTION MODEL
Figure 2: Training
data example, on the
le, ten consecutive
signals are labeled by
11th (right).
e essential hypothesis of CAN
prediction models is that there ex-
ists a dependency of future mes-
sages on recently passed or other
concurrent messages. While our
overall aack detector is unsu-
pervised—that is, we do not re-
quire labeled aack and non-aack
data—we exploit supervised learn-
ing to build a CAN prediction
model. Specically, we create la-
beled data by taking a xed AID’s
most recently observed ten data
elds and try to predict next (11th)
one. Hence, we model each AID
independently.
Let X = {xi }Ni=1 be the set of
training examples and Y = {yi }Ni=1
be the set of labels. Our training data is a tuple (xi ,yi ) where
xi ∈ {0, 1}10×64 and yi ∈ {0, 1}64 as shown in Figure 2.
Recurrent neural networks (RNNs) model temporal/sequential
dependence by including the previous prediction’s hidden state as
well as given inputs into the current prediction [18]. Long Short-
Term Memory (LSTM) layers provide a particular architecture for
portions of an RNN that seek to leverage dependence in modeling
beer than “vanilla” RNNs, as they are craed to avoid vanish-
ing gradient problems common in RNN training [7]. Hence, this
statistical machinery is a natural choice for our model.
We build the model using Keras (www.keras.io), a Python deep
learning module. e model consists of three LSTM layers, a
dropout layer, and two dense layers. e last layer having 64 nodes
(one per predicted bit of the next data eld) as the output and so-
max as an activation function. Between the two dense layers, we
include a dropout layer to prevent overing of our model. We set
the layer’s drop rate to 0.2 (i.e. 20% of neurons in the rst Dense
layer are dropped during training). To train the model we used
Figure 3: Neural Network architecture diagram depicted. Di-
mensions of the vector passed between layers given. Batch
size was set to 32. Dropout between dense layers set to ran-
domly ignore 20% of neurons in the rst Dense layer.
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batch size of 32. Out of several tested architectures, where we var-
ied number of layers and size of the hidden layers, this one showed
best performance. See Figure 3.
For each desired AID, we use the described LSTM on ambient
CAN data collected during normal driving conditions. We denote
such a model M = M(X,Y,AID), where X is the set of training
examples and Y is the set of labels for each example. For a given
input vector xi ∈ X (previous ten observed data elds), letM(xi ) =
yˆi denote the predicted next 64-bit data eld, yi ∈ Y.
To build an anomaly score from the AID’s trained prediction
model, we consider the error of each prediction, ei := ‖yi −yˆi ‖2. To
account for model inaccuracies, compute the mean and variance of
the observed prediction errors by using the model on the training
set. Specically, µ =
∑
X ei/N , and σ 2 =
∑
X(ei − µ)2/(N − 1).
Finally, we compute the Gaussian z-score of newly observed error
zi = (ei − µ)/σ and use the one-sided p-value for our anomaly
score, p-value(z) = 1 − CDF(z), where CDF is the Gaussian normal
cumulative distribution function. Note that if the error is less than
expected (z < 0 ) p-value(z) > 0.5 and p-value(z) → 1 as z → −∞.
Similarly, if the error is greater than expected (z > 0) p-value(z) <
.5, and p-value(z) → 0 as z →∞. Hence, a small p-values occurs if
and only if the error is large relative to observations in training.
3 EXPERIMENT
To respect space constraints, we present two indicative experiments,
one model of an AID that seems to communicate continuous signals,
another of an AID that seems to communicated discrete signals.
Specically, we believe the rst AID communicates four two-byte
messages giving the wheels’ respective speeds and the second AID
a binary indicator for if the vehicle is in reverse. For data collection
we used the Vehicle Spy soware, produced by Intrepid Control
Systems, Inc. (www.intrepidcs.com/products/soware/vehicle-spy)
allowing passive monitoring of CAN data via the OBD-II port.
For training, we used a portion of CAN data recorded during
ambient driving lasting 141 seconds. Figure 4 visualizes a snippet
of the training data for each AID. Once the prediction models are
trained for each AID, we must t a Gaussian to the observed pre-
diction errors using only the training examples. Hence, we apply
the trained model to the training set and observe the prediction
errors {ei }, then compute the mean, µ and variance σ 2.
To test the detector, we inject CAN frames with each AID, sep-
arately, to emulate aacks on the CAN. It is important to stress
that the anomaly detector does not consider the frequency nor the
timestamp of CAN frame, only the sequence of data elds; hence,
Figure 4: Time snippet of training data for two AIDs.
the high frequency injections emulate an ECU that is sending mes-
sages with false content. For each emulated aack (one per AID),
we used an Arduino board for injecting CAN frames as well as the
Vehicle Spy for recording CAN data, both connected to the vehicle
via an OBD-II port.
3.1 Wheel Speed AID
e actual aack happened from 14s to 29s of the trip. During that
time the “aacker” repeatedly injected the same AID with the same
message in the 64-bit data eld. As can be seen in Figure 5, the
p-value of the observed signals occurring between 14s to 29s is
extremely low.
Figure 5: (Top) Time snippet of wheel speed AID testing
data non-attack period (the le half) and the attack period
(the right half). (Middle) Plot depicts themodel’s prediction.
(Bottom) P-value anomaly score depicted for wheel speed
AID. Attack period: 14-29s.
3.2 Reverse Lights AID
e actual aack happened from 14.5s until 29s of the capture.
During that time the “aacker” repeatedly injected the same AID
with the same message in the 64-bit data eld. Referring to Figure
6, it is important to note that the p-value of the observed signals
is extremely low throughout the test set. However, it hits actual 0
during the aack period.
3.3 Results Discussion
Overall, we have a very strong dierence in our anomaly score
between aack and non-aack periods, but nding an a priori
threshold seems problematic. We conjecture that current archi-
tecture is a beer model for nearly continuous signals with many
distinct 64-bit messages (as in Figure 5), that move in a a clear
paern (e.g., as speed increases, the 20 place bit increases from 0 to
1, then the 21 place bit increases from 0 to 1, … ). e second AID
communicating seemingly binary signals is, unsurprisingly, harder
for the model to predict. Perhaps taking inputs from a variety of
other AIDs may enhance prediction accuracy.
3
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Figure 6: (Top) Time snippet ofwheel speedAID testing data.
Non-attack period occurs for roughly the rst quarter and
the attack period in the other three quarters. Top plot de-
picts actual data. (Middle)Plot depicts the model’s predic-
tion. (Bottom) P-value anomaly score depicted for reverse
light AID. Attack period: 14.5-29s.
4 CONCLUSIONS & FUTUREWORK
Recent approaches to build CAN IDSs train a “CAN language
model”, that is, a machine learning model that can accurately pre-
dict the next CAN message from previous or concurrent messages.
Previous works have trained models on reverse engineered signals,
requiring OEM-proprietary (secret) knowledge. In this paper we
build a CAN model at the bit level, eliminating the need for CAN
data translation, and present initial results in use for an IDS.
To build the CAN model, we assumed a dependency between
previous and future data elds within an AID of an automotive
CAN, and train an LSTM recurrent neural network on ambient data
for two AIDs. From both AID CAN models, we build an anomaly
detector based on a relative predicted error of each CAN message.
A very important feature of our method is that our neural network
takes on raw 64-bit messages, and hence does not require extensive
preprocessing, e.g., to reverse engineer proprietary CAN encodings.
e technique works very well with AIDs that carry many distinct
messages (roughly continuous messages) which change oen over
time. On the other hand, applying the same neural network archi-
tecture to an AID with seemingly binary signals (and therefore few
distinct messages) does not yield as convincing results. In partic-
ular, prediction error during the non-aack period during testing
was very large relative to expectations from training (Fig. 6).
For future work, we would like to rene the architecture of the
neural network to more accurately predict non-malicious messages.
Although outside of scope for this paper, we note that prelimi-
nary testing with alternate neural network congurations yielded
less accurate results, but lends credence to future work aimed at
optimizing the architecture for CAN modeling. Additionally, con-
struction of a model that handles more than just one AID at a time
will presumably increase accuracy as CANs communicate states of
many dierent but physically related subsystems. Finally, work is
emerging to automatically discover encoded signals in the CAN
data elds (e.g, [17, 23]); hence, the logical next step is to train the
CAN models conditioned on information from these works.
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